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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 22/07/2011

Accident number: 793

Accident time: 09:50

Accident Date: 01/11/2007

Where it occurred: AF0308/01637,
MF173, Qalai Ahmad
Jan Village, Bagram
District, Parwan
Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Other

Date of main report: None

ID original source: (34)

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 22/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

1

LESSONS LEARNT SUMMARY OF DEMINING ACCIDENT OCCURRED TO [Demining
group] DEMINING TEAM # 2
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team composed of Mr. [Name removed] the QMA and [Name removed]
Team Leader of QMIT-21 was convened by the Area Manager of AMAC Centre to investigate
the demining accident occurred on [the Victim] deminer of [Demining group] DT-2 at Qalai
Ahmad Jan village, Bagram district of Parwan province. The mentioned demining accident
occurred at 09:50 hours on 01 November 2007 in Minefield # AF0308/01637/MF173. As a
result of this accident, the deminer lost his left leg, right foot fracture and some other
superficial injuries to other parts of his body.
SUMMARY:
Minefield # AF0308/01637/MF173 is part of a contaminated area which was recorded by LIS
as SHA#3 of impacted community # 1222. The area was contaminated with AP mines by
Russian forces for security of aircraft ammunition store located at the area during the year
1984. According to request of Qalai Ahmad Jan village residents the clearance of this MF was
started on 04/10/2007. On 01 November 2007 at 09:50 am an accident happened on [the
Victim] deminer of section # 2 of the mentioned team. The victim deminer was walking around
and wanted to cross the boundary of the MF using unclear area that suddenly he stepped on
an AP mine and caused it to explode. The accident happened during rest time of the team
and the deminer was without PPE, so as a result of the accident he lost his left leg, sustained
right foot ankle joint fracture and some other minor injuries to other part of his body. After
applying first aid the victim deminer was evacuated to Bagram airbase Egyptians hospital.
CONCLUSIONS:
The following points were found by investigation team:
•

The deminer ignored the red stones and entered into the unclear area, after
proceeding about 4m stepped on an AP mine and caused it to explode.

•

The accident point has about 500m distance from the deminer working lane, and it
means that the deminer had walked long distance to enter into the unsafe area
without being avoided by command group of the team.

•

The portable latrine of the team was near the work site and there was no need for the
deminer to go elsewhere for defecation/urination.

•

One PMN and one PMN 2 mine and some UXO are visible on the ground next to the
accident point which shows that the area where the deminer was walking is extremely
dangerous.

•

There is much possibility that the victim deminer wanted to take the two mines which
were on the ground and before getting to those mines he became victim of an other
mine which was under ground.

•

All the above mentioned facts reveal that there was poor command and control in the
team/section.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered:
•

Arranging refresher training session is recommended for the team and the training
should focus mostly on safety precautions in the field.
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•

Team command group should strictly control the activity of deminers and do not allow
them to ignore safety standard or act contrary to it.

•

In vain walking into the danger area is considered direct safety breach and should be
avoided by team members, and command group is to control properly the movement
of their staff in the field.

•

[Demining group] management is to take appropriate action to improve the command
and control ability of the team command group to maintain safety precautions during
the demining operation.

Victim Report
Victim number: 983

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available
Protection used: None

Protection issued:

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Body; severe Foot
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Leg
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . . the deminer lost his left leg, right
foot fracture and some other superficial injuries to other parts of his body".

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the Victim
walked through the cleared area without PPE and entered the uncleared area (probably to
collect visible mines) and his errors were not corrected. The secondary cause is listed as
Inadequate training because the investigators identified a need for training and because it is
probable that the Victim acted without fully understanding the risk he was taking. Failure to
provide effective training was a significant Management Control Inadequacy.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have
been more responsible over sharing data than those internationals who presume greater
responsibility.
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